



Security Council

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Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2025

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since the previous report, dated 11 July 2025 (S/2025/460), and highlights continuing progress, as well as areas of prevailing concern. While the parties reiterated their commitment to the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), the situation remained fragile, and violations of the resolution persisted.

2. There was no progress with respect to the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Lebanese territory pursuant to the 27 November 2024 cessation of hostilities agreement and Security Council resolution 2790 (2025), with a presence retained at five positions and the maintenance of two “buffer zones” north of the Blue Line (see S/2025/153, para. 1). The Israel Defense Forces also continued to conduct strikes in the vicinity of the Blue Line as well as in southern and eastern Lebanon.

3. While the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) continued to identify unauthorized weapons south of the Litani River, the reporting period was marked by the tasking by the Cabinet of Lebanon of the Lebanese Armed Forces with the development of a plan to establish exclusive State control over arms. In this context, the Lebanese Armed Forces made further progress in dismantling non-State military infrastructure and seizing unauthorized weapons south of the Litani River, including with the support of UNIFIL. Weapons were also handed over to the Lebanese Armed Forces in several Palestine refugee camps.


II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Cessation of hostilities

4. UNIFIL radars detected 121 trajectories of projectiles fired from south to north of the Blue Line and two trajectories of projectiles fired from north to south of the



Figure II
Weekly air attacks observed by UNIFIL, 21 June to 20 October 2025



Source: UNIFIL.

6. The Israel Defense Forces dropped leaflets over several southern villages warning against collaboration with Hizbullah. On 18 September, the Israel Defense Forces issued “urgent warnings” for residents in Burj Qallawiyah and Shahabiyah (both Sector West), Dibbin and Mays al-Jabal (both Sector East) and Kafr Tibnit in Nabatiyah region. Later the same day, UNIFIL detected air strikes near Burj Qallawiyah and Kafr Tibnit. Peacekeepers heard explosions consistent with reports of air strikes near Dayr Siryan, Mays al-Jabal, and Dibbin (all Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces subsequently stated that it had struck Hizbullah “weapon storage facilities”.

7. On 13 August, the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, Eyal Zamir, stated, “more than 240 terrorists have been eliminated and nearly 600 airstrikes have been carried out” since the cessation of hostilities had come into effect.

8. Since 27 November 2024, at least 109 civilians have been killed by Israeli military operations in Lebanon, including 21 women and 16 children, as verified by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with no reported casualties in Israel. The Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon reported 12 fatalities, including 7 Syrians, following Israeli strikes on “Hizbullah military compounds” in eastern Bīqā‘ on 15 July. The Ministry reported 1 fatality and 11 injuries following strikes by Israel near a hospital in Tibnin (Sector West) on 19 September and 5 fatalities, including 3 children, from a strike near Bint Jubayl (Sector West) on 21 September. In separate statements, Lebanon’s leadership condemned the strike in Bint Jubayl as “a new massacre”. The Israel Defense Forces stated that it “eliminated a Hezbollah terrorist ... who operated in a civilian area” and regretted “civilian casualties”, noting that the incident was “being investigated”.

9. Eight Lebanese Armed Forces personnel were killed and several injured during the reporting period (see para. 26). There were no reported Israel Defense Forces casualties.

10. On 1 September, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Minister of Education, Yoav Kisch, “welcomed ... that approximately 95 per cent of pupils in the north began the school year ... thanks to the severe blow that Israel has landed on Hezbollah and relentless enforcement on the ground”. On 21 September, Mr. Netanyahu stated, “we have been able to return most of the residents of the North ... to their homes”.

B. Respect for the Blue Line

11. The Israel Defense Forces remained present in five positions and maintained two “buffer zones” north of the Blue Line. UNIFIL observed the Israel Defense Forces firing from these positions on numerous occasions, and frequently observed Israel Defense Forces personnel outside those positions engaged in constructing earthworks and other activities north of the Blue Line. On 7 August, UNIFIL observed remote-controlled armed uncrewed ground vehicles south of Yarun (Sector West), later claimed by the Israel Defense Forces.

12. On 2 October, UNIFIL confirmed that the Israel Defense Forces T-wall near Yarun had crossed north of the Blue Line, covering an area of approximately 4,100 m². UNIFIL informed both parties of the violation and requested the Israel Defense Forces to relocate the T-wall.

13. The Israel Defense Forces stated that it had conducted “ground operations” near Hula (Sector East) on 26 June, near Jabal Blat and Labbunah on 9 July and near Ayta al-Sha‘b (all Sector West) on 30 August to “dismantle structures ... used for terrorist” activity. On 13 August, the Israel Defense Forces stated that its Chief of Staff had visited an undisclosed Israel Defense Forces position “in southern Lebanon” (see para. 7). On 11 September, the Arabic spokesperson of the Israel Defense Forces stated that he had visited “a frontline defense position near Khiyam”. The Prime Minister of Lebanon, Nawaf Salam, condemned that “provocative tour” which, he said, “confirms Israel’s determination to undermine stability in the south”.

14. On 11 July, the President of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, stated that the continued presence of Israel north of the Blue Line was “obstructing the Army’s full deployment”. On 18 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that “the Israeli enemy continues ... its ongoing violations of Lebanese sovereignty by land, sea, and air, and its continuous assaults against residents of border villages ... These attacks and violations hinder the deployment of the army in the south ...”.

15. Mr. Netanyahu on 25 August stated that “the recent decision by the Council of Ministers to work towards the disarmament of Hezbollah by the end of 2025 was a momentous decision ... If the Lebanese Armed Forces take the necessary steps to implement the disarmament of Hezbollah, Israel will engage in reciprocal measures, including a phased reduction of [Israel Defense Forces] presence in coordination with the US-led security mechanism.”


16. The Israel Defense Forces continued to occupy northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, while the Government of Israel has yet to respond. On 8 July, UNIFIL peacekeepers observed Israel Defense Forces soldiers firing at a shepherd from an Israel Defense Forces position in Ghajar (Sector East).

17. UNIFIL detected 3,027 violations of Lebanese airspace, with a total overflight time of 3,644 hours and 35 minutes. Drones, including a fibre-optic guided uncrewed

aerial vehicle near Hula on 5 August, accounted for 96 per cent of the violations, fighter aircraft 3 per cent and helicopters and unidentified aircraft 1 per cent.

Figure III

Violations of Lebanese airspace detected by UNIFIL, 21 June to 20 October 2025



Source: UNIFIL.

C. Lebanese Armed Forces deployment

18. Pursuant to the Cabinet’s authorization of the enlistment of 4,500 soldiers (see [S/2025/460](#), para. 18), the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed 789 new recruits south of the Litani River on 22 June. An additional 1,115 new recruits commenced basic training on 14 July. On 18 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that 694 new recruits had deployed south of the Litani River, for a total of 8,985 personnel deployed in the area south of the Litani River.

19. Throughout the reporting period, including prior to being tasked by the Cabinet to develop a plan to establish exclusive State control over arms (see paras. 27–30), the Lebanese Armed Forces increased patrols and installed checkpoints along the Litani River and conducted engineering missions and extensive patrolling south of the Litani River.

20. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force undertook 33 training exercises with the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy and 9 with the Lebanese Armed Forces Air Force. The Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy continued to work closely with the Maritime Task Force to enhance expertise and interoperability.

21. On 12 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy conducted a “pursuit and boarding” of a vessel departing Sidon without proper authorization. The next day, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that “22 people on board were arrested”.

22. See annex III to the present report* for further detail regarding international efforts, including by the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing in line with current liquidity management measures.

Lebanon (UNSCOL) and UNIFIL, to support the strengthened deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River.


D. Disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, including the presence of unauthorized personnel, assets and weapons south of the Litani River

23. On Lebanese Army Day, 31 July, Mr. Aoun stated that the Army “was able to extend its authority over the unoccupied area south of the Litani River, collect weapons, and destroy any that could not be used ... This is attested to by the five-party military committee [Mechanism]”. Mr. Aoun called on “all political forces to ... push to affirm the exclusive possession of weapons by the army and security forces, across all Lebanese territory – today, not tomorrow”.

24. On 16 October, following the eleventh meeting of the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Mechanism (see para. 74), the United States Central Command issued a statement that the Lebanese Armed Forces “has successfully removed nearly 10,000 rockets, almost 400 missiles, and over 205,000 unexploded ordnance fragments during the past year”.

25. UNIFIL identified unauthorized weapons in its area of operations on 117 occasions, including 75 unguarded arms caches consisting of rocket-launching platforms and rockets, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, mortar shells and small-calibre ammunition, in addition to individuals carrying rifles or pistols on 6 occasions and hunters carrying hunting weapons on 34 occasions. The Lebanese Armed Forces reported that 96 per cent of the caches referred to them by UNIFIL had been removed. UNIFIL also identified 42 locations of interest and, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, visited 28 of these, without any significant findings. The Mission also revisited previously identified locations that could not be inspected at the time, including tunnels that had required technical expertise for entry.

Figure IV
Caches of weapons identified by UNIFIL and removed by the Lebanese Armed Forces, 21 June to 20 October 2025



Source: UNIFIL.

26. On 9 August, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that “during the discovery by an army unit of a weapons depot and its work to dismantle its contents in Wadi Zabqin, Tyre, an explosion occurred inside it, which led to the death of six soldiers and the wounding of others”. On 28 August, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that two soldiers had been killed and two others wounded “during the inspection of a drone belonging to [Israel]” in Naqurah (Sector West).

27. On 5 August, Mr. Salam stated that the Cabinet had “decided today to task the Lebanese Army with developing [by 31 August] a plan to confiscate weapons”.

28. On 7 August, the Cabinet “approved the objectives of the proposal presented by United States Special Envoy Thomas Barrack concerning the extension and stabilization of the cessation of hostilities agreement”, including “the gradual end of the presence of non-State armed groups in the country”. On 5 September, the Cabinet clarified that “any progress toward implementing the document [proposal] remains contingent on the commitment of the other parties, foremost among them Israel”.

29. During that same 5 September meeting, the Lebanese Armed Forces presented to the Cabinet its plan to establish exclusive State control over arms. The Cabinet stated that it “welcomed the plan developed by the Army Command and its consecutive phases, aimed at ensuring the implementation of the decision on extending the authority of the state exclusively through its own forces, and to monopolize weapons in the hands of the legitimate authorities”, adding that it “decided to keep the details of the plan and the discussions surrounding it confidential and requested that the Army Command submit a monthly report on the matter to the Council of Ministers”. On 16 September, Mr. Salam stated that “some details of the plan have been leaked ... for example the three months for the complete confiscation of weapons south of the Litani, in addition to containing weapons within the same period by prohibiting their use or transfer from one place to another”.

30. Subsequently, on 29 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that it had launched the first phase of its plan to ensure exclusive State control over arms south of the Litani River. In this regard, at the request of the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL established an arms control task force consisting of combat, engineering, explosive ordnance disposal and medical assets deployable at short notice. On 6 October, the Lebanese Armed Forces presented its first monthly report to the Cabinet.

31. In protest at the Cabinet’s decisions, ministers affiliated with Hizbullah and the Amal Movement walked out of the Cabinet sessions on 5 and 7 August and 5 September. Since 5 August, Hizbullah and Amal Movement supporters have mobilized largely peaceful protests, including motorcade convoys, sit-ins, and rallies in the southern suburbs of Beirut, as well as in southern and eastern Lebanon. On 25 September, two days prior to the one-year anniversary of the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, thousands of Hizbullah supporters gathered on the Beirut waterfront as images of Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine (see [S/2024/817](#), para. 14) were projected onto the landmark Raouché Rock (Pigeon Rock), in contravention of administrative restrictions.

32. On 6 August, Hizbullah stated that it would treat the Cabinet decision “as if it does not exist”, calling it “a clear violation of the National Pact”. The head of Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc, Mohammad Raad, stated on 8 August that “the State, with its own capabilities, can impose its authority but it cannot confront the enemy”.

33. The Secretary-General of Hizbullah, General Naim Qassem, stated on 30 July that Hizbullah’s “weapons represent a source of strength for Lebanon, and we are ready to discuss how they can be integrated as part of Lebanon’s national strength”. On 15 August, Mr. Qassem cautioned against dragging “the army into internal strife”,

stating that “Hizbullah and the Amal Movement agreed to postpone the idea of street demonstrations based on the premise that there is still room for dialogue, for negotiation, for amendments – before reaching a confrontation that no one wants”. On 25 August, he called on the Government to “expel the enemy from our land. End the aggression. Release the prisoners. Begin reconstruction. That is the road map. Only then can we discuss a defense strategy”. On 27 September, Mr. Qassem stated: “We will not leave the arenas and we will not abandon our weapons ... We will not accept disarmament.” He added, “we are advancing, we are recovering, and we are ready for any defense against the Israeli enemy”.

34. On 31 August, the Speaker of Parliament of Lebanon, Nabih Berri, stated that Hizbullah’s weapons could be discussed “within the framework of a calm consensual dialogue ... leading to the formulation of a national security strategy that protects Lebanon, liberates its land and preserves its internationally recognized borders”. Mr. Berri stated, however, that “it is unacceptable, under any circumstance, to throw this fireball into the lap of the Lebanese Army”.

35. On 26 June, the Druze leader and former head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, announced that his Party had handed over its “light and medium weapons” to the Lebanese Armed Forces three weeks earlier.

36. In identical letters dated 25 June 2025 addressed to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General (S/2025/416), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “the documented violations reflect a deliberate strategy by Iran and Hezbollah to rearm and rebuild its military capabilities across Lebanon, including beyond the Litani River. These violations include the reconstruction and restoration of military infrastructure and the repurposing of existing facilities, such as containers, underground facilities and tunnel shafts. They also encompass the storage and stockpiling of weaponry, including strategic arms, such as precision-guided missiles, rockets and rocket launchers ... Hezbollah still possesses an arsenal of tens of thousands of rockets”.

37. Furthermore, in identical letters dated 6 October 2025 addressed to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General (S/2025/621), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “Hezbollah operatives have been observed gathering intelligence and restoring military compounds, tunnels and shafts, often using heavy construction equipment. Hezbollah continues to develop its uncrewed aerial vehicle arsenal and production capabilities, including locally produced drones for both attack and surveillance purposes ... In the absence of meaningful enforcement by the Lebanese Government, Israel is compelled to act unilaterally.”

38. Pursuant to the 21 May agreement between the President of the State of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, and Mr. Aoun (see S/2025/460, para. 33), the disarmament of Palestine refugee camps commenced on 21 August with the handover of the first of three batches of weapons to the Lebanese Armed Forces from the Burj Barajneh camp in the southern suburbs of Beirut. The Lebanese Armed Forces confirmed the handover of “various types of weapons, shells, and different types of ammunition” on 28 August from Burj Shemali, El Buss, and Rashidieh camps in Tyre. The same day, the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee announced that “the process of handing over weapons from within the Palestinian camps south of the Litani River was completed”, specifying that “heavy weapons belonging to Palestine Liberation Organization factions ... were handed over”. On 29 August, the handover of weapons from the Mar Elias and Shatila camps near Beirut took place. Prime Minister Salam stated that he had called President Abbas, “appreciating the progress made ... regarding the handover of heavy weapons from Palestinian camps to the Lebanese Army”. On 13 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that “weapons,

shells, and military ammunition” had been handed over from the Beddawi and Ein el-Hilweh camps in Tripoli and Sidon, respectively. Weapons belonging to factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization have been transferred to the custody of the Lebanese Armed Forces in 8 of the 12 Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon without any related violence. An agreement regarding the status of weapons belonging to factions outside of the Palestine Liberation Organization, including the Hamas movement and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, has yet to be reached.

39. Separately, violence involving firearms and explosives stemming from personal or criminal disputes persisted across Burj Barajneh, Burj Shemali, Ein el-Hilweh, El Buss, Rashidieh and Shatila camps. Armed clashes in Shatila camp on 5 September and in the outskirts of Shatila camp on 19 October prompted intervention by the Lebanese Armed Forces. Due to deteriorating security conditions, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) temporarily suspended services in several camps. Four UNRWA schools in Ein el-Hilweh camp remain inaccessible due to the continued presence of armed actors.

40. On 8 July, the Israel Defense Forces stated it had “eliminated a key Hamas commander” near the Beddawi camp in Tripoli, north Lebanon.

41. With respect to a counter-terrorism operation on 24 June in an undisclosed location, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that it had arrested “one of the most prominent leaders” of Da’esh, adding that “a large quantity of weapons and ammunition, in addition to ... equipment for manufacturing drones, were seized in his possession”.

E. Arms embargo and border control

42. The Israel Defense Forces stated on 25 June that it had “eliminated” the “head of the ‘Al-Sadiq’ Currency Exchange” in a strike in southern Lebanon, alleging that “the ‘Al-Sadiq’ Currency Exchange serves as a funds storage and transfer mechanism for Hezbollah, for funds originating from the Iranian Quds Force”. On 3 July, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had “eliminated a terrorist” in a strike near Khaldah, Mount Lebanon, “responsible for smuggling weapons and advancing terror attacks against Israeli civilians and [Israel Defense Forces] troops on behalf of the Iranian Quds Force”. On 11 July, the Israel Defense Forces stated that its strike near Numayriyah, Nabatiyah district, had “eliminated” a Hizbullah operative involved “in the weapons smuggling route from Iran to locations in the northern arena and Judea and Samaria”. The Israel Defense Forces stated that its strike in the eastern Bīqā’ region on 5 August had “eliminated” a Hizbullah operative allegedly directing “terrorist cells in Syria that planned to launch rockets towards the Golan Heights”. The Israel Defense Forces stated on 11 September that it had “eliminated” in southern Lebanon “a terrorist in the Iranian Imam Hossein Division”, alleging that the “division, run by Iran’s Quds Force, operates from Lebanon with Hezbollah to target Israeli civilians and troops”.

43. In identical letters dated 6 October 2025 addressed to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General (S/2025/621), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that the “physical presence of Iran’s Quds Force on Lebanese soil underscores Tehran’s direct role in facilitating and supervising these activities”. The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, in identical letters dated 20 October 2025 addressed to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General (S/2025/663), “firmly and unequivocally reject[ed] the[se] false and baseless allegations”.

44. The Lebanese Armed Forces conducted at least 58 counter-trafficking operations, mostly in eastern and north-eastern Lebanon.

45. On 1 September, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic agreed to form two bilateral committees on judicial cooperation and border management, respectively. Following a meeting between the President of Lebanon and the President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Ahmad Al-Sharaa, on the margins of the 2025 Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit, held in Doha on 15 September, the Lebanese presidency issued a statement “emphasizing the necessity of coordination to ensure stability along the border”. Marking the first ministerial visit by the new Syrian authorities, on 10 October the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, Asaad Al-Shaibani, met Lebanese officials in Beirut. The same day, the Syrian authorities suspended the Assad-era Lebanese-Syrian Supreme Council, informing the Lebanese authorities that all future communication between the two countries should be conducted exclusively through official diplomatic channels.

F. Landmines and cluster bombs

46. At least 47 operations south of the Litani River and 20 operations north of the Litani River to detonate unexploded ordnance were announced by the Lebanese Armed Forces.

47. UNIFIL responded to 670 reports of suspected unexploded ordnance and cleared 1,800 m² of land north of Naqurah. In addition, UNIFIL provided six explosive ordnance risk awareness sessions for 192 military and civilian personnel and 15 training support events for the in-country validation of multi-role engineering and explosive ordnance disposal units. UNIFIL also conducted 32 quality assurance and quality control visits to demining sites and one accreditation.

III. Extension of State authority and institutional stability

48. On 15 and 16 July, Parliament renewed confidence in the Government, rejecting a no-confidence motion requested by the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, Gebran Bassil. In his response to parliamentarians, the Prime Minister stated: “The extension of the sovereignty of the State over all its territories and its own powers, the limitation of arms, the decision of war and peace in its own hands, and respect for international resolutions, especially resolution 1701 ... are responsibilities ... in the common interest of Lebanon”. On 16 September, Mr. Salam stated: “Our government did not invent the decision to extend the state’s authority over all its territory. This decision has been in place since 1989 ... since the Taif Agreement. Today, we are working to implement and enforce it ...”. The Prime Minister added, “investment, reconstruction, and economic recovery are difficult to achieve without stability, security, and safety in the country.”

49. On 31 July, Parliament adopted a bank resolution law, a prerequisite for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance programme, as well as a law on the organization of the judiciary. Implementation of the bank resolution law is contingent, however, on the adoption of complementary “fiscal gap” legislation that has yet to be submitted to Parliament. On 6 September, President Aoun returned the law on the organization of the judiciary to Parliament, stating that “it was marred by formal, material, and substantive errors” and was in “violation of international principles, foundations, and standards”.

50. On 11 July, the Cabinet filled key judicial and financial vacancies, including in the position of Financial Prosecutor and the four vice-governors of the Central Bank.

On 11 September, the Cabinet appointed the members of the regulatory authorities for the electricity and telecommunications sectors. On 22 September, the Cabinet endorsed the 2026 State budget, pending review in Parliament as at 20 October. Following its country visit from 22 to 25 September, IMF on 26 September stated, “the authorities have made progress in developing a strategy to address the severe banking sector challenges ... though the legislation needs further refinement ... to fully align with international standards”, adding that it “expected a more ambitious approach to the 2026 government budget”.

51. Judge Tarek Bitar continued questioning suspects and defendants in the investigation into the 4 August 2020 Beirut Port explosion. For the first time, Cabinet members joined families of the victims to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the explosion. On 22 September, the Minister of Justice, Adel Nassar, signed an extradition request for the alleged charterer, arrested on 5 September in Bulgaria, of the vessel that had transported the ammonium nitrate to the Beirut Port (see [S/2020/1110](#), para. 46).

52. On 14 July, the Central Bank issued a circular prohibiting all licensed banks and financial institutions from engaging with “unlicensed money exchange institutions, money transfer companies, associations, or entities such as the Hizbullah-affiliated Al-Qard Al-Hassan Association”.

53. As at 15 October, at least 64,417 people, 51 per cent of whom were women, remained displaced. The continued presence of the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line, in combination with their persistent kinetic activity, the presence of unexploded ordnance and extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, continued to impede returns. Humanitarian partners continued to support conflict-affected communities in meeting essential needs amid security and funding constraints.

54. As at 30 June, the 2025 appeal for the Lebanon Response Plan was 25 per cent funded at \$655 million of the \$2.635 billion requested, with \$432 million received so far in 2025 and \$223 million carried over from 2024. The 2025 appeal for the Lebanon Response Plan includes, for the first time, a dedicated focus on returns to the Syrian Arab Republic. Separately, UNRWA faces projected cash flow gaps that imperil the continuity of essential services for 222,000 Palestine refugees in Lebanon beyond 2025.

55. On 25 June, the World Bank approved a \$250 million loan agreement, pending ratification by Parliament. Funding will be disbursed through the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Project “to support the most urgent repair and reconstruction of damaged critical public infrastructure and lifeline services, and the sustainable management of rubble in conflict-affected areas” under the auspices of the Council of Development and Reconstruction (see [S/2025/460](#), para. 47). The Prime Minister’s office commenced development of a comprehensive plan to unify, coordinate and prioritize recovery and reconstruction efforts.

56. As at 30 September, 647,038 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, including 636,051 of an estimated 1.4 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon and 10,987 refugees and asylum-seekers of other nationalities. Since 8 December 2024, 105,300 Syrians had fled to Lebanon, primarily into the northern and eastern governorates. As at 20 October, 102 deportation incidents following raids, arrests at checkpoints and failed onward movements by sea, involving at least 4,091 Syrians, had been recorded.

57. On 1 July, following the issuance of a circular by General Security waiving exit fees, overstay fines and re-entry bans for Syrian and Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic returning to the Syrian Arab Republic, UNHCR launched its voluntary return programme. As at 30 September, UNHCR in Lebanon had supported

the return of 17,291 Syrians, while 118,764 others had expressed interest. In 2025, at least 294,912 Syrian refugees were removed from the UNHCR database following their return to the Syrian Arab Republic.

IV. United Nations presence

A. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon force deployment and adaptation

58. As at 20 October, UNIFIL consisted of 10,290 military personnel from 48 contributing countries, 816 of them women (7.93 per cent). In addition, UNIFIL had 742 civilian staff, comprising 227 international and 515 national personnel, including 238 women (32.08 per cent). The Maritime Task Force operated with five vessels and 626 military personnel, including 55 women (8.79 per cent). There were 50 military observers, including 40 men and 10 women (20 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization serving with the Observer Group Lebanon under the operational command and control of UNIFIL. The highest-ranking military women hold the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, while the most senior civilian woman serves at the D-1 level.

59. To address financial challenges facing all United Nations peacekeeping operations, UNIFIL adopted contingency plans to reduce expenditures by 15 per cent for the 2025/26 financial year. UNIFIL will reduce both its military and civilian components while maintaining core mandated activities as well as non-discretionary spending, including that related to the safety and security of peacekeepers.

60. For the first time since 27 November 2024, UNIFIL reached full operational tempo, with an average of 6,848 operational activities each month, peaking at 7,864 in August. Twenty-four per cent of the activities were conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, and 13.7 per cent involved mixed-gender teams. UNIFIL also averaged 73 monthly air activities.

61. Pursuant to its adaptation plan, UNIFIL focused its operations on assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces in establishing exclusive State control over arms south of the Litani River (see paras. 27–30). UNIFIL also increased its visibility and presence along the Blue Line and identified areas that remained unreachable due to the presence of roadblocks, destroyed roads, landmines and unexploded devices. At the request of the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL conducted several operations to provide security to local residents during harvest season. UNIFIL also continued to engage with the parties regarding the use of new technology for monitoring, reporting and force protection. To this end, UNIFIL deployed counter-uncrewed aerial vehicle assets to positions along the Blue Line.

62. UNIFIL continued to experience restrictions of its freedom of movement and incidents of aggressive behaviour, including by the Israel Defense Forces as well as local actors (see annex I). A peacekeeper was slightly injured on 11 October when the Israel Defense Forces dropped a grenade near a United Nations position near Kfar Kila. Roadblocks around the five Israel Defense Forces positions and the two “buffer zones” north of the Blue Line continued to impede UNIFIL’s access to the Blue Line. UNIFIL peacekeepers twice had to use tear gas to disperse crowds of local actors restricting their movement.

63. The Maritime Task Force hailed 2,498 vessels in support of maritime interdiction operations. The Lebanese Armed Forces inspected and cleared all 494 vessels referred by UNIFIL. The Mission accompanied the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy during 29 vessel inspections.

64. Pursuant to Security Council resolution [2436 \(2018\)](#), UNIFIL completed the assessment of 19 subordinate military units and two vessels for logistics, training and operational preparedness on 13 October, with all identified shortfalls addressed.

B. Safety and security

65. Movement restrictions remained in place throughout Lebanon. With the exceptions of Tyre and along the Tyre-Naqurah coastal road, the use of armoured vehicles and 48 hours' notice was required for movement of civilian personnel in the UNIFIL area of operations.

66. Kinetic activity, unexploded ordnance and other remnants of war continued to pose a threat to the safety and security of personnel. Between 21 and 25 June, in the context of the hostilities between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in view of the risk of falling debris, UNIFIL personnel along the Blue Line sheltered on several occasions (see [S/2025/460](#), para. 58).

67. UNIFIL opened two technical investigations into violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) that involved direct impacts on UNIFIL personnel or assets. The Mission concluded one technical investigation and shared its findings with the parties.

C. Conduct and discipline

68. UNIFIL recorded four allegations of possible unsatisfactory conduct. No allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation were reported in UNIFIL or UNSCOL. UNIFIL conducted a workshop for 37 national investigations officers from contingents from 10 troop-contributing countries. Training on United Nations standards of conduct was provided to 1 civilian and 1,254 military personnel (74 women and 1,181 men).

D. Accountability for attacks on peacekeepers

69. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against peacekeepers. An expedited hearing was held on 28 July in the case of the fatal attack against UNIFIL near Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022 (see [S/2023/184](#)), with six of the seven defendants convicted. One defendant was sentenced (in absentia) to death, while two were sentenced to prison and fines, three were fined and one was acquitted. On 13 August, the prosecution filed an appeal challenging the acquittal and the sentencing of five of the defendants. The first appeal hearing will be scheduled upon completion of procedural notifications.

70. There was no progress in criminal proceedings related to the 4 August 2018 incident in Majdal Zun (Sector West) (see [S/2018/1029](#)). Investigations continued into acts of aggression against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Shaqra on 22 December 2021, Bint Jubayl on 4 January 2022, Ramiyah on 25 January 2022 and near Rafic Hariri International Airport on 14 February (see [S/2022/214](#) and [S/2025/460](#)).

71. Following an investigation into the aggressive denial of freedom of movement of a UNIFIL patrol and the physical assault of a peacekeeper on 10 June in Dayr Qanun al-Nahr (see [S/2025/460](#), annex I), one suspect has been detained and referred to the military prosecutor for further inquiry. Efforts are ongoing to identify and apprehend additional suspects.

72. The Military Cassation Court has scheduled a hearing on 6 November for the appeals filed in the cases of attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Sidon on 26 July 2011 and in Burj Shemali (Tyre) on 9 December 2011.

V. Liaison and progress towards sustainable solutions

73. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon exercised her good offices with relevant authorities and actors in Lebanon, Israel and the region and beyond to promote confidence-building measures to consolidate the cessation of hostilities. The Special Coordinator also advocated that the parties take concrete steps towards negotiated solutions to advance long-stalled provisions of resolution 1701 (2006).

74. UNIFIL continued its engagement with the parties to promote security arrangements aimed at facilitating the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from areas north of the Blue Line. UNIFIL hosted meetings of the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Mechanism on 25 June, 12 August, 7 and 21 September and 15 October. The September meetings were chaired by the United States envoy, Morgan Ortagus, and the United Nations Special Coordinator attended the September and October meetings. Discussions centred on the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from areas north of the Blue Line and the implementation by the Lebanese Armed Forces of its plan to ensure exclusive State control over arms. The Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNIFIL also sought the support of the parties for the refurbishment of damaged Blue Line marker barrels.

75. UNIFIL continued to utilize its liaison and coordination mechanisms to defuse tensions along the Blue Line. There were 5,001 interactions with the Israel Defense Forces to deconflict movements. UNIFIL issued 38 stop-firing requests to the Israel Defense Forces, including 1 on behalf of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

76. On 21 August, UNIFIL assisted the parties and the International Federation of the Red Cross to repatriate an Israeli citizen, detained in Lebanon, through the Naqurah/Rosh Haniqra gate. In support of the protection of civilians, UNIFIL maintained liaison with both parties and facilitated 1,793 civilian and humanitarian movements.

77. In August, UNIFIL finalized an assessment of all 272 Blue Line markers, concluding that 200 were intact, 60 had been damaged or destroyed and 12 were inaccessible. Subsequently, UNIFIL reported that several additional markers had been damaged by the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL repaired three markers damaged during the conflict (see S/2025/460, para. 66).

78. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area proposed in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/641, annex).

VI. Observations

79. I note the progress made towards the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) over recent months. However, much remains to be done. We must not allow these hard-won gains to be lost. I welcome diplomatic efforts towards consolidating the cessation of hostilities and urge the parties to avail themselves of the enhanced arrangements under the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Mechanism, the established liaison and coordination channels of UNIFIL and the good offices of my Special Coordinator for Lebanon to address any disputes or threats.

80. To move beyond a fragile cessation of hostilities, I call on the parties to ensure the protection of civilians, to create the space for dialogue towards the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and, ultimately, a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel that will yield the enduring security and stability that communities on both sides of the Blue Line deserve. I again call upon all actors to refrain from unilateral or provocative action that could jeopardize the cessation of hostilities. The failure, actual or perceived, by one party to meet its obligations under resolution 1701 (2006) is not a justification for the other party to renege on its obligations.

81. The presence of the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line coupled with their continued military strikes in Lebanon are violations of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and of resolution 1701 (2006). They undermine the efforts of the Lebanese authorities to achieve exclusive State control over arms and also undermine the return of residents to their homes. I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty by Israel and call again for the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory. I urge the Israeli authorities to fulfil their obligations under resolution 1701 (2006) to withdraw from all areas north of the Blue Line, including from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line. I reiterate the offer of UNIFIL to support security arrangements that can strengthen the confidence of communities on both sides of the Blue Line.

82. It is essential to bring all weapons under State control and ensure that the State is able to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory. I welcome the steps taken by the Lebanese authorities to take forward their commitments, including through the Cabinet's decision to task the Lebanese Armed Forces with the development of a detailed plan in that regard.

83. I also note progress related to the monopoly of the State of Lebanon over weapons in Palestine refugee camps. In addition to such efforts, however, complementary efforts to overcome political stagnation between Lebanon and Israel on key provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), as well as to respond to the legitimate security and socioeconomic concerns of all segments of Lebanese society, must be pursued in parallel. The United Nations remains fully committed to providing its support in this regard.

84. Extending my appreciation for the generous support provided to date, I call on donors to bolster tailored material and financial support to the Lebanese Armed Forces commensurate with their own commitment to the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and the magnitude of the challenge facing the Lebanese Armed Forces.

85. Further to the decision by the Security Council in its resolution 2790 (2025) to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a final time, the Mission will intensify its efforts for the remainder of its mandate to support the strengthened deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River and to help ensure that the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line is free of any armed personnel, assets or weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon or UNIFIL. In addition, the Mission will continue to support the parties in their efforts to achieve sustainable security and stability for communities on both sides of the Blue Line, including through consolidation of the cessation of hostilities and support to the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Mechanism, as well as restoration of the integrity of the Blue Line.

86. In line with resolution 2790 (2025), preparations are under way with respect to the request to explore options for the future of the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) after the withdrawal of UNIFIL.

87. The freedom of movement of UNIFIL is essential for the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). Incidents affecting the freedom of movement of UNIFIL are of great concern and should stop. I welcome public statements from the Lebanese

authorities expressing support for the Mission and condemning attacks on peacekeepers. Perpetrators of attacks against UNIFIL must be held to account.

88. The firing of weapons by the Israel Defense Forces at or near UNIFIL personnel and premises is unacceptable, as are acts of aggression by Lebanese individuals. I reiterate that both parties must ensure the protection of civilians, comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, and ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel, their freedom of movement, and the inviolability of United Nations premises and property.

89. I note the conclusion of the trial relating to the attack in Aqibiyah in December 2022, in which one peacekeeper was killed and three injured. The United Nations continues to call for accountability for all attacks against peacekeepers.

90. With the parliamentary elections due to be held by May 2026, I call upon the Government and Parliament of Lebanon to prioritize reforms that ensure timely, inclusive and participatory elections, including to enable further gains in women's political representation and to enhance accessibility for persons with disabilities. I count on the Lebanese authorities to make available the necessary financial resources and to facilitate timely technical and administrative preparations to ensure the integrity and transparency of the elections.

91. While incremental steps have been taken by the Government and the Parliament towards the implementation of economic, financial and judicial reforms, I note that progress, including on passing legislation in line with international standards, is essential for IMF assistance, donor and depositor confidence and to help put Lebanon back on the path towards sustainable recovery and reconstruction. Meanwhile, additional resources for humanitarian and recovery response are crucial.

92. I encourage continued bilateral cooperation between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic in the interest of stability in both countries and security along their shared border. The launch by UNHCR of the voluntary repatriation programme for Syrian refugees in Lebanon is a welcome step towards a gradual and sustainable voluntary return of Syrian refugees.

93. Palestine refugee camps are already experiencing considerable hardship and volatility. Sustained donor support to UNRWA remains critical for safeguarding the provision of essential services for Palestine refugees in Lebanon and preserving stability in the camps.

94. I note the significant impact that the 15 per cent reduction in expenditures, due to the liquidity crisis affecting peacekeeping operations, will have on the ability of the Mission to implement its mandate. I urge the cooperation of the parties as the Mission adjusts to these constraints and reaffirm the continued commitment of the United Nations to supporting the parties in fully implementing resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). I also stress the importance of all Member States paying their assessed contributions to the peacekeeping budget in full and on time.


95. I express my sincere gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and the Observer Group Lebanon. I thank the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert and the Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNIFIL, Major General Diodato Abagnara. I also thank the troop-contributing countries, whose forces continue to be vital to supporting the parties in upholding their obligations under the cessation of hostilities agreement and resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), and all members of the United Nations country team for their continued dedication to stability in Lebanon.

Annex I

Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 June to 20 October 2025

1. In paragraph 15 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, was fully respected and unimpeded. It called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by UNIFIL for the purpose of swift investigation, including all locations of interest, all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line (as reported in [S/2019/237](#)) and unauthorized firing ranges, in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.
2. In line with UNIFIL's adaptation plan, UNIFIL continued its operation-oriented approach. During the reporting period, UNIFIL conducted a monthly average of 7,864 operational activities, including 73 air operations. The percentage of UNIFIL's operational activities conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces was maintained at 24 per cent.
3. While UNIFIL's freedom of movement was in general respected, the Mission experienced several incidents in which violence or weapons were used to intimidate peacekeepers, which resulted in injuries to peacekeepers or damage to UNIFIL assets, or interfered with operations. Incidents of note occurred near Kfar Shuba on 3 and 20 July when the Israel Defense Forces opened fire across the Blue Line near a UN position, forcing peacekeepers to take security measures. Several concerning incidents also occurred in conjunction with UNIFIL's operations to remove roadblocks near observation point Marwahin (Sector West), in September, with the Israel Defense Forces dropping grenades near UNIFIL personnel and pointing their weapons at peacekeepers. Two serious incidents also took place near Marun al-Ra's (Sector East) on 2 October when the Israel Defense Forces dropped grenades near peacekeepers who had been providing security for local residents. On 11 October, a peacekeeper was slightly injured after a grenade was dropped near a UN position near Kfar Kila (Sector East). UNIFIL protested each of these incidents to the Israel Defense Forces.
4. UNIFIL also continued to encounter roadblocks around the five Israel Defense Forces positions and the two "buffer zones" north of the Blue Line. While UNIFIL reestablished access to UN position 8-33, northeast of Hula (Sector East) in June, and observation point Marwahin on 10 September, the Israel Defense Forces presence continues to restrict access to UN Position 1-31, southwest of Alma al-Sha'b (Sector West), UN position 9-63, south of Udaysah (Sector East), and UN position 9-64 south of Kfar Kila.
5. UNIFIL also experienced incidents involving local actors in which violence was used to intimidate UNIFIL peacekeepers, UNIFIL equipment was sometimes damaged, or the peacekeepers had to use alternative routes. In addition to the incidents listed below, UNIFIL experienced minor incidents during which items such as stones or bottles were thrown at UNIFIL property or personnel without causing damage or injuries. Each of the incidents has been raised by the Mission with the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Figure V
Incidents of restrictions of freedom of movement of and aggressive behaviour against UNIFIL



Source: UNIFIL.

Restrictions of the freedom of movement or aggressive behaviour involving the Israel Defense Forces

6. On 3 July, the Israel Defense Forces fired hundreds of small arms bursts from south of the Blue Line towards Kfar Shuba (Sector East). A few impacts were observed on the bunker wall of a nearby UNIFIL position, likely caused by ricochets from bullets that struck rocks outside the perimeter of the position, approximately 25 meters from the bunker.

7. On 19 July, Israel Defense Forces personnel south of the Blue Line pointed their weapons at a UNIFIL patrol that was operating in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces southeast of Qatmoun (Sector West).

8. On 20 July, the Israel Defense Forces opened heavy machine gun fire from south of the Blue Line, southeast of Kfar Shuba, prompting peacekeepers to take security measures. There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel or damage to equipment.

9. On 24 July, the Israel Defense Forces pointed the barrel of a tank and a laser towards a UNIFIL patrol southeast of Marun al-Ra's.

10. On 8 August, two Israel Defense Forces soldiers using megaphones urged a UNIFIL patrol operating in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces northeast of Kfar Kila to "leave the area" or they would open fire. The UNIFIL patrol continued its activity as planned.

11. On 23 August, the Israel Defense Forces directed a high caliber weapon system, mounted on a bunker, towards Observer Group Lebanon personnel at observer point MAR, southeast of Markaba (Sector East).

12. On 25 August, the Israel Defense Forces aimed the turret of an automatic weapon system, equipped with a machine gun, towards UNIFIL peacekeepers in Hula.

13. On 25 August, an Israel Defense Forces drone dropped a grenade near a group of people in Kfar Kila as a UNIFIL patrol was passing by about 50 meters away. There were no injuries.
14. On 28 August, an Israel Defense Forces soldier pointed their weapon towards a UNIFIL patrol operating in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces near Arab al-Wazzani (Sector East).
15. On 30 August, an Israel Defense Forces vehicle followed an Observer Group Lebanon patrol southwest of Markaba, with the vehicle's mounted machine gun continuously pointing at the peacekeepers.
16. On 31 August, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line aimed several long-range green laser beams towards UNIFIL peacekeepers southwest of Alma al-Sha'b (Sector West), prompting the patrol to move to a secure location.
17. On 1 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed a red laser beam at a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Naqurah, prompting the patrol to move to a secure location.
18. On 2 September, an Israel Defense Forces tank, at one of the five Israel Defense Forces positions north of the Blue Line, pointed its turret gun towards a UNIFIL patrol east of Marwahin.
19. On 2 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed a green laser beam at a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Alma al-Sha'b.
20. On 2 September, Israel Defense Forces drones dropped four grenades close to UNIFIL peacekeepers working to clear roadblocks that were hindering access to observation point Marwahin near the Blue Line. One of the grenades impacted within 20 metres and three within approximately 100 metres of UNIFIL personnel and vehicles. The grenades did not cause any injuries or damage. The UNIFIL activity had been preceded by rigorous information exchange and coordination with the Israel Defense Forces.
21. On 4 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed green laser beams towards a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Alma al-Sha'b.
22. On 4 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed a red laser beam towards a UNIFIL patrol near Naqurah.
23. On 6 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed multiple green laser beams at two UNIFIL patrol vehicles near Alma al-Sha'b, prompting the UNIFIL patrol to return to its base.
24. On 8 September, the Israel Defense Forces pointed a red laser beam at a UNIFIL foot patrol southwest of Naqurah.
25. On 8 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel pointed their weapons at UNIFIL peacekeepers removing roadblocks near observer point Marwahin, prompting the peacekeepers to take security measures.
26. On 10 September, the Israel Defense Forces pointed blue lasers towards a UNIFIL foot patrol southwest of Naqurah.
27. On 12 September, UNIFIL peacekeepers conducting a foot patrol inside a UN position, southwest of Naqurah heard a voice from an Israel Defense Forces position

nearby ordering them to retreat and the sound of the loading of a weapon. The patrol responded by saying “understood”, stopped for several minutes, and then continued its movement inside the UN position.

28. On 16 September the Israel Defense Forces fired approximately 450 rounds of machine gun fire from south to north of the Blue Line, impacting near a UN position southeast of Markaba, prompting peacekeepers to take security measures.

29. On 16 September, the Israel Defense Forces pointed green laser beams at UNIFIL personnel inside a UN position southwest of Naqurah.

30. On 18 September, the Israel Defense Forces told UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces personnel inspecting suspicious equipment southwest of Naqurah “to stop activities, or personnel will be the object of fire.” UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces stopped the activity and moved to a safe position.

31. On 20 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel pointed their rifles towards UNIFIL peacekeeper conducting a bunker alarm drill southwest of Naqurah. Following the incident, UNIFIL requested to speak with the Israel Defense Forces commander in the area, [response to be added].

32. On 23 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed a green laser beam at the window of a UNIFIL patrol vehicle northeast of Sarda (Sector East).

33. On 25 September, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed a green laser beam at a UNIFIL patrol northwest of Ayn Arab (Sector East).

34. On 30 September, an Israel Defense Forces tank at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed its turret towards a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Markaba.

35. On 1 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel south of the Blue Line pointed a green laser beam at a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Khiyam (Sector East).

36. On 1 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel south of the Blue Line pointed a green laser beam towards a UN position near Ghajar (Sector East).

37. On 2 October, the Israel Defense Forces dropped a grenade about 30 meters away from UNIFIL peacekeepers in Marun al-Ra’s, who were providing security to local residents. About 20 minutes later, a second group of peacekeepers at the same location observed a second grenade exploding approximately 20 meters above their heads, creating a bright flash and white smoke. There were no injuries to UNIFIL personnel nor to the local residents who were present. UNIFIL had informed the Israel Defense Forces of its planned activity in advance. As the incident transpired, UNIFIL issued a formal “stop-firing” request to the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL also subsequently raised the incident with the Israel Defense Forces in writing.

38. On 3 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed green laser beams at UNIFIL patrol vehicles northeast of Sarda.

39. On 8 October, two Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed their rifles for a few seconds at an Observer Group Lebanon patrol, northeast of Marwahin.

40. On 8 October, an Israel Defense Forces soldier pointed his weapon toward five UNIFIL peacekeepers who were preparing for the Liaison Branch to cross the Blue Line, southwest of Naqurah (Sector West).

41. On 9 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel in vehicles at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed a green laser toward a UN position southwest of Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East).

42. On 11 October, an Israel Defense Forces drone dropped a grenade approximately forty meters outside the fence of a UN position in Kfar Kila. The resulting shrapnel projection caused light injury to one of the UNIFIL peacekeepers who was inside the position. UNIFIL has launched a technical investigation into the incident. UNIFIL has also written to the Israel Defense Forces protesting the incident. Following the incident, the Israel Defense Forces issued a statement saying that it had “operated to distance suspects, who attempted to reestablish a military structure belonging to the Hizbullah terrorist organization in the Kfar Kila area by means of a grenade.” The Israel Defense Forces acknowledged the communication from UNIFIL and stated that that it reviewed the incident and “reinforced safety distance procedures for strikes near UNIFIL positions.”

43. On 15 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel at one of the five positions north of the Blue Line pointed an infrared light towards a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Sarda.

44. On 16 October, Israel Defense Forces personnel directed a flashlight towards a Lebanese Armed Forces position, where UNIFIL was present, whereafter the Lebanese Armed Forces directed a flashlight toward the Israel Defense Forces. The Israel Defence Forces subsequently fired approximately 10 to 15 rounds near the Lebanese Armed Forces position. UNIFIL immediately issued a “stop fire” request, whereafter the engagement quickly ceased.

Restrictions of the freedom of movement or aggressive behaviour involving Lebanese actors

45. On 21 June, 50 individuals in civilian clothes blocked the path of a UNIFIL patrol northwest of Tibnin (Sector West) by placing vehicles across the road. After about an hour, the patrol was able to move to an adjacent area where the Lebanese Armed Forces was waiting, whereafter the patrol continued its activity. The incident was filmed and shared on social media. UNIFIL issued a public statement reiterating that freedom of movement is a core requirement for the implementation of its mandate.

46. On 28 June, five individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol southeast of Brashit (Sector East) and stating that the patrol could not proceed without being accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The crowd subsequently grew to ten individuals, with one of the individuals joining the group claiming that the road was private property. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter, following which the patrol left the area together with the Lebanese Armed Forces and continued its activity using an alternative road.

47. On 2 July, an individual in civilian clothes on a motorcycle gestured to a UNIFIL patrol near At Tiri (Sector West) to turn around. The patrol moved to a nearby location where it met up with the Lebanese Armed Forces which advised the peacekeepers to avoid At Tiri due to planned Ashura commemorations. The patrol then continued its activity using an alternative route.

48. On 4 July, three individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol west of Srifa (Sector West) stating that the patrol could not continue its movement. The patrol continued its activity using an alternative route.

49. On 9 July, a UNIFIL patrol near Jibal Al Butm (Sector West) encountered a low-hanging electric cable stretching between buildings, blocking the road. Several individuals explained that the road was not passable due to an airstrike with about 17

people gathering around the patrol, while a civilian vehicle blocked the road behind. After the Lebanese Armed Forces and the deputy mayor arrived, UNIFIL resumed its activity using an alternative route. Later the same day, UNIFIL confirmed that there had been an airstrike in the area.

50. Also on 9 July, about 15 individuals blocked the road of another UNIFIL patrol near Jibal Al Butm, without explaining the reason. After the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, the patrol continued its activity using an alternative route. The mayor of Jibal Al Butm later informed UNIFIL that the individuals involved were local youth, acting independently.

51. On 10 July, about 10 individuals in civilian clothes, with motorbikes, blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol near Aytiti (Sector West), while throwing stones and beating the patrol vehicles with their hands as well as placing car tires in front of the UNIFIL vehicles. After warnings via a loudspeaker, the patrol used two smoke grenades to disperse the crowd. Meanwhile, individuals continued to throw stones, hitting one of the peacekeepers, without causing injury. The patrol vehicles then pushed aside the motorbikes blocking the road and continued their movement. Following the incident, the mayor of Aytiti stressed that while he coordinates UNIFIL access to the village with the Lebanese Armed Forces “intrusions” on private property remain unacceptable to the community.

52. On 16 July, an individual in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol west of Ibil al-Saqi (Sector East). The patrol turned around and left the area.

53. On 20 July, five individuals in civilian clothes with three vehicles blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol north of Frun (Sector East). The peacekeepers used an alternative road to continue their activity. Following the incident, the mayor of Frun suggested to UNIFIL that the perpetrators may have been outsiders.

54. On 21 July, eight individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol west of Dayr Kifa (Sector West), stating the patrol could not be present without the Lebanese Armed Forces. After the peacekeepers explained the purpose of the patrol, their attitude became more positive and, after the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, the UNIFIL patrol continued its activity. Following the incident, the mayor of Days Kifa explained that local youth had stopped the last three vehicles of the patrol as they had been separated from the rest of the patrol and were entering private property.

55. On 24 July, a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Hariss (Sector West) encountered large stones blocking the road, apparently as the result of a landslide. While taking another road, one of the patrol’s armored personnel carriers got stuck in the vegetation. Soon thereafter, five agitated individuals in civilian clothes arrived and started striking the vehicle with their hands. The group subsequently grew to 15 individuals. After the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, the patrol resumed its activity. Following the incident the mayor of Hariss stated that the patrol was stopped as it entered a dead end. He advised that UNIFIL should coordinate its patrols with the Lebanese Armed Forces.

56. On 9 August, two individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol southeast of Zibqin (Sector West), stating they were not allowed to be present without the Lebanese Armed Forces as they were entering an area of private property. After the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, the patrol continued its movement. A few minutes later, another individual in civilian clothes blocked the road of the patrol, stating the patrol could not continue as it was entering private property. After the Lebanese Armed Forces returned to the area, the patrol continued its movement for a second time.

57. On 10 August, four individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol near an olive grove south of Bafliyah (Sector West), stating the patrol was about to enter private property. An additional 15 individuals with vehicles arrived within minutes, with one of the individuals hitting one of the UNIFIL vehicles with a telescopic baton, breaking the rear-view mirror. The peacekeepers subsequently used tear gas to disperse the crowd, whereafter they continued their movement. Following the incident, the mayor of Bafliyah stated that the patrol had entered private property, and that the aggressive posture of the peacekeepers fueled tension.

58. On 10 August, UNIFIL peacekeepers reported that an individual in civilian clothes threw a stone toward a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Mays al-Jabal, lightly damaging the vehicle.

59. On 11 August, a group of about 30 individuals blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Al Malikiyah (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived after about 30 minutes, whereafter the patrol continued its movement. Following the incident the mayor of Al Malikiyah stated that local youths often act spontaneously when patrols are not accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces.

60. On 28 August, five individuals in civilian clothes threw stones at UNIFIL patrol vehicles, northwest of Ayn Ba'al (Sector West), causing minor damage to two of the patrol vehicles. The local mayor informed UNIFIL that the incident will be investigated.

61. On 9 September, 12 individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL vehicle patrol north of Ash Sh'aytiyah (Sector West), shouting and throwing stones, while stating the patrol had to be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. After a short interruption, the patrol continued its movement.

62. On 14 September, five individuals in civilian clothes threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol passing south of Jibal Al Butm (Sector West), resulting in slight damage to one of the UN vehicles.

63. On 16 September, approximately 15 individuals in civilian clothes threw stones at a UNIFIL vehicle patrol in Alahmadiya (Sector East) prompting the peacekeepers to leave the area and use an alternate route.

64. On 28 September, an individual in civilian clothes stopped an Observer Group Lebanon patrol northwest of Kafra (Sector West) and informed the patrol that to continue on the road posed a safety risk. The patrol turned around and proceeded on a different route.

65. On 1 October, four individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Naffakhaniyah (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces soon arrived, whereafter the patrol continued its movement. About an hour later, the same patrol was stopped for a second time by a group of nine individuals in civilian clothes. After a short stop, the patrol was able to continue its movement.

66. On 3 October, two individuals in civilian clothes on motorcycles stopped a UNIFIL patrol southeast of Alahmadiya (Sector East) and asked the patrol to leave the village. The patrol left the village and resumed its planned activity.

67. On 4 October, a group of individuals in civilian clothes threw stones at a UNIFIL vehicle southwest of Tibnin, resulting in minor damage to the vehicle.

Incidents not attributed to any party

68. On 3 October, a UNIFIL vessel operating in the UNIFIL Area of Maritime Operation experienced electronic interference from an unknown source for approximately 30 minutes, affecting its global positioning and radar systems.

69. On 5 October, UNIFIL Maritime Task Force vessels experienced electronic interference from an unknown source for approximately 45 minutes, affecting essential navigational and surveillance equipment, including the global positioning and automatic identification systems and radar assets.

70. On 9 October, a UNIFIL patrol near Alma al-Sha'b experienced electronic interference from an unknown source, including radio interference in an unspecified language.

71. On 14 October, a UNIFIL patrol southeast of Marun al-Ra's experienced electronic interference from an unknown source, temporarily disrupting their global positioning system.

Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. Paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) states that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States regarding allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

2. In identical letters dated 25 June addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2025/416](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “attempts to reactivate smuggling routes along the Lebanese-Syrian border have also been observed [...] Hezbollah is making concerted efforts to restore its military capabilities through transfer of funds [...] Iran initially attempted to resume direct financial transfers to Hezbollah via direct flights to Lebanon and also through indirect flights via third countries Recently, Hezbollah has shifted to more sophisticated methods, primarily using the “hawala” system through money exchange offices in Lebanon, transferring hundreds of millions of dollars through this channel. Overall, an estimated one billion dollars has been transferred to Hezbollah since the ceasefire came into effect [...] Hezbollah’s aerial unit continues to produce thousands of UAVs under the guidance and funding of Iran”.

3. In response, in identical letters dated 10 July addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2025/458](#)), the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations rejected “the baseless and fabricated allegations levelled against the Islamic Republic of Iran in the [Israeli] letters dated 29 May and 25 June 2025”.

4. In identical letters dated 6 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2025/621](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “Hezbollah has intensified smuggling by land, air, and sea, including efforts to reestablish arms smuggling routes along the Lebanese-Syrian border using local smugglers, operatives, and reportedly tunnels [...] on August 19, Syrian forces intercepted a truck carrying Grad rockets from Syria into Lebanon via the Homs route, a known smuggling corridor running from southwest of Homs towards northeastern Beqaa. This recent illustrative case follows multiple thwarted attempts to smuggle anti-tank missiles, launchers, and RPGs across the border in areas like Al-Hermel and Al-Qusayr.

5. On 15 August, Hizbullah Secretary General Naim Qassem stated “thank you to the Islamic Republic of Iran, which supported us with money, weapons, resources and political and media positions. Iran stood by us, bore the burden with us, and offered martyrs”.

6. Separately, the Syrian Ministry of Interior announced on 13 July that it had detained a suspected terrorist connected to “a cell affiliated with the Lebanese Hezbollah militia” in possession of “explosive devices [obtained] through illegal smuggling crossings”. On 19 August, the Syrian Ministry of Interior stated that “the Internal Security Forces in Homs seized a car loaded with Grad missiles that were being smuggled towards the Lebanese border”. On 11 September, the Syrian Ministry of Interior announced the arrest of a “terrorist cell affiliated with the Hezbollah militia” operating in the western Damascus countryside, adding that heavy weapons including “rocket launchers, 19 Grad rockets, anti-tank missiles, individual weapons,

and large quantities of various ammunition were confiscated” and that “preliminary investigations revealed that cell members received training in camps inside Lebanese territory and were planning to carry out operations inside Syrian territory that would threaten the security and stability of citizens”. Hizbullah, in a statement dated 11 September, categorically refuted the allegations, stating that it had “no presence or activities in Syria” and was “fully keen on Syria’s stability and its people’s security”.

7. On 18 October, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had “thwarted an attempt to smuggle weapons in the Mount Hermon area”, noting that “a number of suspects were arrested who attempted to smuggle weapons from Syrian territory to Lebanese territory ... the forces arrested the suspects and transferred them for investigation after they attempted to smuggle hand grenades, pistols, anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition”.

8. As detailed in paragraph 63 of this report, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to support maritime interdiction operations, hailing 2,498 vessels.

9. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

Annex III

Mobilization of international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces

1. In paragraph 11 of its resolution [2790 \(2025\)](#), the Security Council urged “the international community to intensify its support, including equipment, material and finance, to the LAF in order to ensure their effective and sustainable deployment south of the Litani River and to enhance their capacities to implement resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), ... [and requested] ... the Secretary-General to continue adapting UNIFIL’s activities, within its mandate, to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL”.

2. During the reporting period, President Aoun continued to advocate for increased support for the Lebanese Armed Forces. In his speech delivered during the General Debate of the Eightieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, on 23 September, the President stated, “Furthermore, there is the issue of providing the necessary means to our legal armed forces so that they may take on the task in defending and safekeeping our national integrity. We remain hopeful about the public initiatives to organize international conferences dedicated to that purpose.” According to readouts published by the presidency, many of the President’s engagements with dignitaries on the margins of the General Debate included discussions on prospective support to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Such support was also a key theme of discussions between President Aoun and United Kingdom Foreign Secretary David Lammy during the latter’s official visit to Lebanon on 4 July. Moreover, following a meeting between Prime Minister Salam and French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on 24 July, a statement released by the French Presidency noted that the latter had committed to continuing “to contribute to strengthening the Lebanese army, which must ensure the state's monopoly on weapons throughout the territory”. Later, in a 6 September statement welcoming the Lebanese Government’s endorsement of the Lebanese Armed Forces plan to assert exclusive state control over weapons, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that France “stands ready to organize two conferences in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces and of recovery and reconstruction when conditions allow”. Lebanese Armed Forces Commander General Rodolph Haykal also made trips abroad to rally financial and technical support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, traveling to Jordan in July and Qatar in October, while receiving several delegations for discussions on financial support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and opportunities for technical assistance.

3. On 30 June, Qatar formally announced its provision of \$60 million in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces (see [S/2025/460](#), annex III, para. 7). According to the statement released by the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the announcement came “within the framework of the State of Qatar’s firm commitment to support the Republic of Lebanon, stand by the brotherly Lebanese people, and its firm belief in the importance and necessity of joint Arab action”. The European Union (EU), on 23 June, launched a €12.5 million project to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in “leading recovery efforts, enhancing security and helping communities in Southern Lebanon rebuild”. On 10 September, the United States announced the approval of a package for Lebanon with an estimated value of \$14.2 million, intended to “build the capability and capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces to dismantle weapons caches and military infrastructure of non-state groups, including Hizballah”.

4. The Military Technical Committee for Lebanon convened in London on 15 and 16 September to review the evolving requirements of the Lebanese Armed Forces in

the context of the ongoing implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement and the plan to establish exclusive state control over weapons. During the meeting, the admission of three new members – Qatar, the Republic of Korea and Türkiye – signified the growing interest among Member States in supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL and UNSCOL attended the meeting as observers.

5. In coordination with the Committee, several Member States continued to provide critical support to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Equipment, including that related to explosive ordnance disposal, was provided by Germany, the Netherlands, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Spain and the United Kingdom delivered training courses and, in several cases, contributed to the enhancement training infrastructure for the Lebanese Armed Forces. Sustainment support, intended to enhance the wellbeing of Lebanese Armed Forces personnel, was provided by France, Italy, the Republic of Korea, Spain and the United States. The Netherlands and Italy continued to provide support to civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities, while, outside the remit of the Military Technical Committee, the European Union, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States provided equipment, training and infrastructure to support border control and management. With funding from France and the EU, and support from the United Nations Development Programme, the International Organization for Migration and partners, the Lebanese Armed Forces, on 30 September, inaugurated the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre at the Beirut Naval Base. Focusing on prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery at sea, the Centre will coordinate maritime emergencies, rescue operations, and strengthen cooperation among the Army, ministries and security agencies, with UNIFIL participation.

6. Pursuant to the memorandum of understanding signed on 10 June for the provision of non-lethal material support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (see [S/2025/460](#), annex III, para. 9), UNIFIL delivered 55,263 kilograms of food rations and 442,620 litres of fuel to the Lebanese Armed Forces. In a separate initiative, on 16 September, UNIFIL gifted 101 vehicles, including four-wheel drive vehicles, cargo trucks, water tankers, ambulances, and luggage transport vehicles, as well as other equipment to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

7. Efforts to enhance the integration and complementarity of funding mobilized through the United Nations in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces continued during the reporting period. Of \$38 million in donor funding, including pledges, received by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes from Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, and Spain, \$32.7 million was channeled through the “Livelihood Ecosystem” project (see [S/2025/460](#), annex III, para. 9) in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Under a broader United Nations strategy of support to the security sector, seven United Nations agencies, funds and programmes are supporting the implementation of 20 projects in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces, in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, including in support to operational readiness, CIMIC activities for trust building, upgrading the main logistics warehouse, introducing modern supply chain systems and renewable energy solutions, removal of rubble and unexploded ordnance, border control, maritime security, and capacity development in the areas of migrant protection, human rights, mediation, and women, peace and security. Funding totaling \$2.1 million from the European Union and the Netherlands was also directed to the Lebanese Mine Action Centre. The Lebanese Armed Forces also endorsed and promulgated an anti-sexual harassment and domestic violence policy, developed with support from the United Nations, and delivered related training to officers in border regions.